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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
APPLIES TO INDIAN TRIBES
James A. Poore HI*
I. ISSUE
The scope of Indian jurisdiction has again been addressed by
the United States Supreme Court in Strate v. A-1 Contractors.1
Strate held that the tribal court of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation could not exercise jurisdiction with respect to an
automobile accident that occurred on the reservation. However,
the Court's analysis did not preclude tribal court jurisdiction
over non-Indians. The extent of Indian jurisdiction and the pro-
cedures by which it is determined has been a frequent subject of
Supreme Court opinions.2 The extent of Indian jurisdiction, both
regulatory and judicial, is hotly contested because of the general
perception that Indian tribes and their courts are not subject to
the United States Constitution, and thus due process, equal
protection, and other constitutional protections are not available
to the constituents and litigants. This article addresses the valid-
ity of that perception.
How can it be that within the borders of the United States,
citizens-both Indian citizens and non-Indian citizens-of the
United States may be subject to unconstitutional actions by
tribal governments and tribal courts?3 Whether tribes do, in
fact, provide protections of the Constitution, many apparently do
not believe that they have any obligation to do so.4 In the book
* Partner, Poore & Hopkins, PLLP, Missoula, Montana; J.D., University of
Montana 1968; BA., Stanford University 1965. The author developed an interest in
Indian law while assisting his former partner, Urban L. Roth, in the litigation of
cases involving Indian law issues. Mr. Roth successfully argued Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), before the United States Supreme Court as Special
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Montana.
1. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997). This article is not about Indian jurisdiction (either
regulatory or adjudicatory) per se. Rather, it is about the existence of constitutional
constraints upon tribal jurisdiction for those matters where a tribe, in fact, has regu-
latory or adjudicatory jurisdiction. The diminishment and the elimination of Indian
jurisdiction, however, is an essential part of the thesis of this article, in that juris-
diction is the power to decide and the power to legislate. Thus, a diminishment or
elimination of tribal jurisdiction by Congress or the courts is a diminishment or
elimination of retained tribal power and related, retained sovereignty.
2. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, itself, cites over half a dozen of the Court's own
cases relating to the scope and procedures of tribal jurisdiction decided within the
last twenty years. The power of tribes and the limitations on that power has become
an everyday issue for those living on or near reservations.
3. This is the generic question the author has been asked many times in
many forms by clients and others.
4. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAw DESKBOOK 165 (Julie Wrend & Clay Smith, eds.,
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Killing the White Man's Indian, a lawyer-who is an Indian and
a tribal member-is quoted:
Tribes are able to deny fundamental rights in tribal court and
then hide behind the principle of sovereignty. They have the
power to do anything they want to do. Many tribal court deci-
sions have nothing to do with fairness .... '
The perception that the Constitution of the United States
does not apply to tribal governments originates with the 1896
Supreme Court decision Talton v. Mayes.' In Talton the Su-
preme Court reviewed a situation in which one Cherokee Indian
was charged with the murder of another Cherokee Indian within
Cherokee territory. The Court held that the Indian defendant
could not object to the manner in which the tribal grand jury
was impaneled on the grounds that it violated the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. The Court declared that its opinion
rested on the origin of the tribe's power, which was the Cherokee
Nation-not the United States. In other words, the offense was
against the tribe, and the power to punish the offense was with-
in the powers which, at the time, had been retained by the
tribe.7 The Court held that the tribe was not subject to the Con-
1993). "Hearings held before the United States commission on Civil Rights concerning
ICRA [Indian Civil Rights Act] enforcement included allegations of repeated due
process violations by tribes [and] allegations that tribal officials control or manipulate
judicial opinions .... ." Id.
5. FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN: REINVENTING
NATIVE AMERICANS AT THE END OF THE CENTURY 314 (1996).
6. 163 U.S. 376 (1896). Talton has been historically cited by the Supreme
Court for this proposition. For example, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe cites
Talton v. Mayes for the proposition that the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian
tribal governments. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191, 194 n.3 (1978) (citing Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)). This statement is dicta because the Court held that
Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and punish non-
Indians. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 664 n.11 (Rennard
Strickland & Charles F. Wilkinson, eds., Miche 1982) (1942) [hereinafter COHEN
(Strickland ed.)] (citing Talton for the proposition that Indian tribes are not bound
by Constitutional limitations).
It does not, however, appear that Talton has been critically analyzed in over
100 years. It may or may not be of interest that the Supreme Court decided Talton
on the same day that it decided Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding
that "separate but equal" satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment).
7. The Court referred to the 1866 treaty with the Tribe which provided that:
The judicial tribunals of the Nation shall be allowed to retain exclusive ju-
risdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising within their country in
which members of the Nation .. . shall be the only parties, or where the
cause of action shall arise in the Cherokee Nation, except as otherwise
provided in this treaty.
Talton, 163 U.S. at 380-81.
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stitution, because it was acting upon its retained powers (or
retained sovereignty).'
This article examines whether the holding in Talton, and the
cases that rely on Talton, are still valid in light of the fact that
Indians and Indian reservations were integrated and assimilated
into the United States by congressional, judicial, and other ac-
tions. Furthermore, this article examines the constitutional re-
strictions and presumptions imposed on Congress when it acted
to reverse this tribal integration and assimilation.
II. THESIS
The perception that the Constitution does not apply to Indi-
an tribes is derived from the assumption that Indian tribes have
retained some element of their original sovereignty. If tribes
have retained original sovereignty, the Talton Court reasoned,
then tribes have power to govern-a power not granted by the
United States-and thus, not subject to the Constitution. Howev-
er, this article will show that, by virtue of their assimilation into
the United States, Indian tribes have lost all of their retained
powers that are inconsistent with the rights of citizens of the
United States. The powers tribes have with respect to citizens
originate with the United States and are, therefore, subject to
the Constitution of the United States.
Courts have consistently held that the United
States-specifically Congress-has plenary,9 or absolute, power
over Indian tribes.1" This plenary power subjects tribes' re-
tained sovereignty to complete defeasance. Congress has engaged
in a course of legislative conduct with respect to Indian nations
and Indian tribes that has resulted in the complete defeasance of
retained tribal power and retained sovereignty."
8. The Court stated in its analysis:
The crime of murder committed by one Cherokee Indian upon the person of
another within the jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation is, therefore, clearly
not an offense against the United States, but an offense against the local
laws of the Cherokee Nation ....
Id. at 381.
It follows that, as the powers of local self-government enjoyed by the Chero-
kee Nation existed prior to the constitution, they are not operated upon by
the fifth amendment, which, as we have said, had for its sole object to
control the powers conferred by the constitution on the national government.
Id. at 384.
9. Plenary is defined as "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (6th ed. 1990).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978) (discussed in-
fra Part III.B.).
11. Significantly, a number of Supreme Court cases indicate, generally in dicta,
3
Poore: The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian Tribes
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1998
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Legislative examples of such conduct include: Acts granting
citizenship to Indians; Acts providing for the allotment of Indian
lands and reservations; and Acts eliminating the status of tribes
as independent nations and powers. By granting citizenship to
tribal members, Congress gave them the same constitutional
rights as other citizens. By enacting the Allotment Acts and
other Acts discussed herein, Congress intended to abolish tribes
and reservations.
To the extent that Congress, by the Indian Reorganization
Act (Wheeler-Howard Act) of 193412 and other legislation,13 at-
tempted to revive tribal sovereignty, it was precluded from pro-
viding for the creation of any tribal governments or tribal judi-
cial systems that do not comport with the Constitution of the
United States. Because of the de facto integration of Indian and
non-Indian cultures on reservations, to the extent that Congress
has not acted or has not acted properly, the Constitution is self-
implementing. Thus, within the borders of the United States,
citizens-both Indian citizens and non-Indian citizens-are enti-
tled to the protection of their constitutional rights, and courts
have the power to take affirmative action to provide for that
protection.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Retained Sovereignty and Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes
The inherent sovereignty of tribes existed before their inte-
gration into the United States.14 Talton reasoned that this sov-
ereignty preceded the Constitution, and thus was not affected by
the Constitution.15 The Supreme Court viewed tribes as initially
being "domestic dependent nations."6 By virtue of their initial
integration into the United States, tribes lost some of their in-
that Indian tribes have retained sovereignty to some extent with respect to various
issues. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). While
the validity of the references to retained sovereignty in this case and many others
are questioned by the thesis of this article, there do not appear to be any cases in
which the Supreme Court has specifically determined that the retained sovereignty
has survived the congressional and other actions discussed in this article.
12. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994).
13. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1303 (1994).
14. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
15. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). "It follows that, as the pow-
ers of local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee nation existed prior to the con-
stitution, they are not operated upon by the fifth amendment . . . ." Id.
16. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
[Vol. 59
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herent sovereignty. 7 Through acts of Congress, tribes lost their
retained sovereignty-that is, the sovereignty which preceded
the Constitution of the United States. This does not mean that
tribes are no longer sovereign. Rather, the retained sovereignty
that the tribes lost by integration into the United States and by
congressional action has been replaced, in part, by sovereign
powers 8 granted to tribes by Congress. The sovereign powers
that tribes now possess, including inherent powers, 9 flow from
congressional action and are therefore subject to the Constitu-
tion.
B. The Plenary Power of Congress with Respect to Indian Tribes
The essential holding in Talton is that the Constitution did
not apply to the retained sovereignty of the Cherokee tribes.'
Congress has the power to eliminate any retained sovereignty of
Indian tribes that is inconsistent with the Constitution, and it
has done so. Congress has accomplished this through numerous
actions in exercise of its plenary power over Indian tribes. The
power of Congress to control and govern Indians and tribes is
without question.2
Congress has the power to completely eliminate Indian sov-
ereignty. The Supreme Court recognized this power in United
17. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1981).
18. The power to govern "includes all the specific powers necessary to accom-
plish the legitimate ends and purposes of government." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1396 (6th ed. 1990).
19. Inherent powers are those powers necessary to implement the specific pow-
ers which have been granted. These powers were recognized by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323-24 (1819), as they ap-
plied to the federal government. These powers are limited, however, by the Constitu-
tion. See id. at 323. The inherent powers which tribes would have as the result of
congressional action would be very narrow:
But exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the depen-
dent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressio-
nal delegation.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
20. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
21. The power to govern and to legislate which arises from the fact of posses-
sion of territory was articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542-43 (1828). It was expressly applied to Indians, who
were within the geographical limits of the United States, by the Court in United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-81 (1886). The Court has also indicated that
the basis of Congress' power over tribes and Indians is the Commerce Clause. See
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973).
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States v. Wheeler:22
Indian tribes are, of course, no longer "possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty." Their incorporation within the terri-
tory of the United States, and their acceptance of its protection,
necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty
which they had previously exercised. By specific treaty provi-
sion they yielded up other sovereign powers; by statute, in the
exercise of its plenary control, Congress has removed still oth-
ers ....
. . . The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a
unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.2
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,' the Supreme Court
indicated that Congress had plenary authority to limit tribal
sovereignty. Chief Justice Fuller in Stephens v. Cherokee Na-
tion,25 indicated that Congress possessed "plenary power of
legislation in regard to [tribes], subject only to the Constitution
of the United States." 28 Congress, in the exercise of its power
with respect to tribes, is not bound by treaties with the tribes,
since it may supersede or abrogate them.
An example of the extent of Congress' power is demonstrated
in Negonsott v. Samuels.28 There, the Supreme Court again rec-
ognized the plenary authority of Congress.' It considered the
Kansas Act ° and held that Congress had granted criminal ju-
risdiction to the state of Kansas for all offenses involving Indians
on Indian reservations within the state.3 Moreover, Talton it-
self recognized that the retained tribal sovereignty was "subject
always to the paramount authority of the United States."32
However, Talton held that Congress had not (yet) acted to elimi-
nate retained tribal sovereignty. 3 The Court indicated that the
22. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
23. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
24. 455 U.S. 130, 146 (1982).
25. 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
26. Stephens, 174 U.S. at 478.
27. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903); The Cherokee
Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871).
28. 507 U.S. 99 (1993).
29. See Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 103.
30. Act of June 8, 1940, Pub. L. 76-565, 54 Stat. 249 (1940) (codified as 18
U.S.C. § 3243 (1994)). Public Law 280, which applied to all of the states, would
likewise be valid. See infra Part III.C.
31. See Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 106.
32. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 380 (1896).
33. See id. at 384.
[Vol. 59
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"existence of the right" of Congress to regulate did not, in and of
itself, eliminate the retained sovereignty of the tribe.'
C. Congress Has Engaged in a Course of Conduct with Respect
to Indian Nations and Indian Tribes That Has Resulted in a
Complete Defeasance of the Retained Tribal Power and the
Retained Sovereignty Which Was the Basis of the Court's
Decision in Talton.
1. Talton v. Mayes
Significantly, Talton did not involve the power or authority
of Indian tribes with respect to the rights of citizens of the Unit-
ed States. Rather, Talton involved "[t]he crime of murder com-
mitted by one Cherokee Indian upon the person of another."35
The Court in Talton could not have treated the defendant as a
United States citizen." Therefore Talton did not determine the
status of the Cherokee Tribe's retained sovereignty and authority
to adjudicate the rights of citizens of the United States.
2. The Legislative Course of Conduct of Congress
Throughout history, Congress has engaged in a course of
conduct that involved integrating Indians and their governments
into the United States and reducing tribal powers to facilitate
Indian integration into the existing political community. This
conduct and some of the reasons for it were recognized by the
Supreme Court more than one hundred sixty years ago:
34. See id.
35. Id. at 381.
36. The Court did not indicate that the defendant was a citizen. Furthermore,
Talton, the defendant, could not have been viewed as a citizen by the Court. At the
time of Talton only the Allotment Acts had provided that Indians, not subject to
special legislation, could become citizens. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat.
388, 390. The Allotment Acts provided that one of the ways an Indian could become
a citizen was to leave the reservation. See § 6, 24 Stat. at 390. In Talton the defen-
dant was a Cherokee Indian on the reservation. Taiton, 163 U.S. at 381. The other
way the Acts provided for citizenship was for an Indian to become an allottee. See §
6, 24 Stat. at 390. At the time of Talton, the Supreme Court had not yet decided at
what point in time the Allotment acts made Indian allottees, citizens. The Acts were
unclear whether Indians were made citizens at the time of the allotment or twenty-
five years later when the patent was issued. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 504-05 (1905),
decided this issue nine years after the decision in Talton. Thus, in Talton the defen-
dant could not have been considered a citizen. In re Heff was later purportedly over-
ruled by United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916). This purported overruling does
not change the fact that the issue of when citizenship accrued had not been decided
at the time of Talton.
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The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indi-
ans, within a state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be tempo-
rary. This is shown by the settled policy of the government, in
the extinguishment of their title.... [A] sound national policy
does require that the Indian tribes within our states should
exchange their territories, upon equitable principles, or, eventu-
ally, consent to become amalgamated in our political communi-
ties.
At best they can enjoy a very limited independence within
the boundaries of a state, and such a residence must always
subject them to encroachments from the settlements around
them; and their existence within a state, as a separate and
independent community, may seriously embarrass or obstruct
the operation of the state laws. If, therefore, it would be incon-
sistent with the political welfare of the states, and the social
advance of their citizens, that an independent and permanent
power should exist within their limits, this power must give
way to the greater power which surrounds it, or seek its exer-
cise beyond the sphere of state authority.37
a. Citizenship of Indians Diminished or Eliminated Tribal
Sovereignty That Was Inconsistent with the Constitutional Rights
of Citizens.
As Congress made Indians citizens of the United States-a
process completed in 1924, almost thirty years after Talton-any
retained sovereignty of tribes was diminished and eliminated
insofar as it was inconsistent with the rights of citizens of the
United States.38 Congress did not have the right or the power to
grant Indians rights different from the rights of other citizens of
the United States. In other words, Congress could not make
Indian citizens second-class citizens.
The Court has addressed the issue of whether Congress may
compromise the rights of citizens, and it has consistently held
that Congress does not have such power. In Reid v. Covert,39 the
Supreme Court considered whether the rights of citizens of the
United States living abroad were somehow limited because of
37. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 593-94 (1832) (M'Lean, J., con-
curring).
38. As discussed, the very process of making Indians, citizens, imposed the
Constitution on tribes. Also in Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 527
(1905), the Court indicated that the application of the Constitution was "self-opera-
tive."
39. 354 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1956).
[Vol. 59
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treaties signed by the United States.' The Court held that Con-
gress did not have the power to limit the rights of its citizens by
treaty, even if those citizens were living outside the United
States. The Court based its analysis on the fact that Congress
does not have the power to act outside the Constitution at all.4'
In Elk v. Wilkins,42 decided before the enactment of general
acts granting Indians citizenship, the Court held that tribal
membership was inconsistent with citizenship. The Court viewed
tribes as alien powers and reasoned that one could not become a
citizen of the United States without giving up all allegiance to
alien powers.' If contemporary tribes still possess retained sov-
ereignty, then tribal members who are citizens of the United
States have an allegiance to an alien power, which is precluded
by Elk."
Thus, when Congress made tribal members citizens of the
United States, it necessarily eliminated any retained sovereignty
of tribes which would require that tribal member citizens have
an allegiance to an alien power. Also, Congress necessarily re-
40. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
41. See id. at 5-6, 16, 18 (plurality opinion). The Court held:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the
limitations imposed by the Constitution ....
. i. The obvious and decisive answer to [the suggestion that Con-
gress could, by treaty, limit the rights of U.S. citizens], of course, is that no
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on
any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution ....
This Court has also repeatedly taken the position that an Act of
Congress, which must comply with the Constitution, is on a full parity with
a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsis-
tent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty
null. It would be completely anomalous to say that a treaty need not com-
ply with the Constitution when such an agreement can be overridden by a
statute that must conform to that instrument.
Id.
42. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
43. See Elk, 112 U.S. at 102.
44. Significantly, Elk was decided after the Act of March 3, 1871, which provid-
ed that Indian tribes were no longer independent nations or powers within the Unit-
ed States, and that fact is referred to in the opinion. Elk, 112 U.S. at 107. When
discussing an Indian who had become a citizen, the Court noted that he was from
one of those Indian nations which "have totally extinguished their national fire, and
submitted themselves to the laws of the states," or from a tribe which had "lost the
power of self-government." Id. at 108. In other words, he did not have an allegiance
to an alien power and thus he could be a citizen.
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moved any retained powers of tribes inconsistent with the Con-
stitutional rights of Indians as citizens.45 Before Congress made
any Indians citizens, the Supreme Court had indicated that all
citizens must have the same rights. In 1824, Chief Justice Mar-
shall stated:
A... citizen is indeed made a citizen under an act of Con-
gress, but the act does not proceed to give, to regulate, or to
prescribe his capacities. He becomes a member of the society,
possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in
the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The
constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge
those rights."
Surprisingly, dicta in Duro v. Reina47 suggested that Indi-
ans who are tribal members are second-class citizens, in that
they may not have the same rights, vis-a-vis their own tribes,
that other citizens--even Indians who are not members of that
tribe-have. The Court in Duro determined that tribal court
jurisdiction did not apply in a criminal matter to an Indian citi-
zen who was not a tribal member, and stated:
Retained criminal jurisdiction over members is accepted by our
precedents and justified by the voluntary character of tribal
membership and the concomitant right of participation in a
tribal government, the authority of which rests on consent.4
It would come as a great surprise to the 1924 Congress and
to many tribal members that Indian citizens are "consenting" to
tribal membership and thus are waiving their constitutional
rights vis-a-vis the tribe. Such a concept is contrary to the rest of
constitutional law.49 Rather, it is likely that Congress thought it
had abolished tribal government." In any event, Congress
clearly did not intend for Indians to be subject to unconstitution-
al actions of tribes when it began granting citizenship to Indians.
Congress, prior to 1924, had granted some Indians citizen-
45. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
46. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824)
(emphasis added); see also In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 504 (1905).
47. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
48. Duro, 495 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
49. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). "It has been pointed out
that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental
constitutional rights and we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights.' Id. (footnotes omitted).
50. See supra Part III.B.
[Vol. 59
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ship."' Significantly, Congress chose to grant citizenship to Indi-
ans who received allotments under the Allotment Acts (the
Dawes Act), 2 since Congress clearly did not intend for Indian
reservations or tribes to survive the allotment process." The
Allotment Acts also granted citizenship to Indians who voluntari-
ly took up residence apart from any tribe of Indians.' The Acts
themselves provided that the Indian citizens could not be de-
prived of equal protection by either the state or territory in
which they resided."5 The dicta in Duro notwithstanding, tradi-
tional constitutional law principles, including equal protection,"
would require that when Congress granted citizenship to all
Indians, it eliminated any power or retained sovereignty of tribes
inconsistent with the Constitution. 7
b. Allotment Acts
The General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) granted the Presi-
dent authority to allot portions of reservation land to tribal
members, and (with tribal consent) to sell the surplus lands to
white settlers." In Montana v. United States" the Court clear-
ly stated that the congressional intent and policy that drove the
51. See, e.g., General Allotment Act (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)
(codified in scattered sections in 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994)); ch. 818, 25 Stat. 392
(1888) (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 182 (1994)) (Indian women marrying white men); ch.
95, 41 Stat. 350 (1919) (repealed by Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 501) (Indians
who served in military during World War I).
52. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (1887).
53. See infra Part HI.C.2.b.
54. See infra Part IH.C.2.b.
55. See infra Part III.C.2.b. Congress obviously felt that its Indian citizens
would not be residing on reservations, since only states and territories were men-
tioned.
56. The Supreme Court has made it clear that all citizens are to be treated as
equal. See infra Part Ill.E.
57. Interestingly, the Supreme Court appears to ignore the fact that Indians are
citizens. This may be because not all Indians have been citizens, even after the 1924
act (because of the birth requirements). Thus, for example in United States v. Wheel-
er, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978), the Court held that a tribe could punish its member
based on retained sovereignty. The Court based part of its analysis on the distinc-
tions between Indians and citizens. The Court's analysis relates to acts of Congress
which pre-date Indian citizenship. See id. Clearly the Court does not address the
issue of whether the retained sovereignty of tribes was diminished by Congress when
it made tribal members citizens of the United States, or whether tribes are required
to treat their citizen members in a constitutional manner.
58. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 432 (1975). When the
tribes did not consent, then Congress, at times, provided for sale without consent of
the tribes. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
59. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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General Allotment Act and subsequent allotment acts was the
abolition and dissolution of tribes and tribal government.' ° In
its analysis the Court stressed that Congress never intended for
non-Indians who settled on reservations-having purchased
allotted lands-to be subject to tribal regulatory authority."'
The Court concluded that:
It defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend
that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become sub-
ject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allot-
ment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal govern-
ment.62
The recognition by the Montana Court that Congress, by the
Allotment Acts, intended to abolish tribes and tribal relations
and never intended for non-Indians to be subject to tribal regula-
tory authority is in absolute conflict with the dicta elsewhere in
the opinion. That dicta suggests that tribes have retained some
inherent, sovereign power to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians on reservations.' The issue is not whether the tribes
60. The Court stated:
The policy of the Acts was the eventual assimilation of the Indian popula-
tion and the "gradual extinction of Indian reservations and Indian ti-
tles." . . . And throughout the congressional debates on the subject of allot-
ment, it was assumed that the "civilization" of the Indian population was to
be accomplished in part by the dissolution of tribal relations.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9 (citations omitted). In the Allotment Acts Congress
never intended that non-Indian citizens who settled on reservations would ever be
subject to tribal authority.
There is simply no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress
intended that the non-Indians who would settle upon alienated allotted
lands would be subject to tribal regulatory authority. Indeed, throughout the
congressional debates, allotment of Indian land was consistently equated with
the dissolution of tribal affairs and jurisdiction.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
61. See id.
62. Id. (emphasis added)
63. In dicta, the Montana Court stated:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on
non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relation-
ships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within
its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.
Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted). The "[t]o be sure" language in Montana, indicating
that tribes retain inherent sovereign power over non-Indians, is also in direct conflict
12
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have power over non-Indians, however limited, but whether the
power is a retained power.
The Court noted in language which followed the above-quot-
ed discussion of congressional policies and intent"' that these
policies were "repudiated" in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization
Act.' This "repudiation," however, did not result in reinstate-
ment of "retained inherent sovereign" power. Rather, the Indian
Reorganization Act, to the extent that it "repudiated" prior con-
gressional action, did so by granting power to tribes and provid-
ing for the possibility of restoring the reservations. The source of
that power, however, was not the retained, inherent sovereignty
of the tribes, but was the United States." By 1934, the re-
tained, inherent power of tribes was abolished.
The Allotment Acts were a de jure elimination of the re-
tained powers of the tribes.6 7 By instantly making some Indians
citizens, they resulted in de facto elimination of powers." The
powers which tribes now have are not retained powers. Rather,
they are new powers, given to them by Congress and are subject
to the Constitution.69
Dawes, himself, apparently thought his law would make
Indians part of the nation, bringing them under the "shelter" of
the Constitution.70 Based on the language in Montana, Con-
with the language in Montana which immediately precedes it:
Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal mat-
ters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition that
the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activi-
ties of non-members of the tribe.
Id. at 565 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
64. This indicated that Congress did not intend for tribes to survive the allot-
ment process.
65. Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9.
66. Such a grant of power, is of the same kind as the grants of power which
Congress has historically given to Territories. The Court in Montana in its dicta is
treating the repudiation by Congress of prior policy as restoring retained sovereignty.
As will be discussed, that is not possible. Tribes would appear to have, among the
sovereign powers given to them by the United States, limited inherent powers. See
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324 (1819). These inherent powers
would, however, be subject to Constitutional constraints. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 324. Perhaps the Court was using "retained" in this sense.
67. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9.
68. See In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 504 (1905). See generally infra Part III.E. The
Act itself provided that when it made an Indian a citizen, that citizen "is entitled to
all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens . .. ." 24 Stat. 390; see
also Hagan v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 411 (1994), which held that settlement of reserva-
tions by non-Indians was a de facto diminishment of reservations and tribal powers.
Certainly, making tribal members citizens had a similar impact.
69. See infra Part III.E.
70. See BORDEWICH, supra note 5, at 119.
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gress as a whole did not appear to have had a different intent.71
When discussing the passage of the Allotment Acts, Indian schol-
ar Francis Paul Prucha in his book American Indian Policy in
Crisis,72 quotes the language of Senator Richard Coke73 as rep-
resentative of the position of the sponsors of the Dawes Act:
The policy of the bill is to break up this large reservation, to
individualize the Indians upon allotments of land; to break up
their tribal relations and to pass them under the jurisdiction of
the Constitution and laws of the United States and the laws of
the States and Territories in which the lands are situat-
ed .... 7
4
The Supreme Court has also held that one of the effects of
the Allotment Acts was the partial or complete diminishment of
Indian reservations themselves. 75 In Hagen v. Utah7" the Su-
preme Court held that the Uintah Indian Reservation was di-
minished by Congress when it enacted one of the numerous acts
which constituted the General Allotment Act and its successors.
The Court stated:
In light of our precedents, we hold that restoration of
unalloted reservation lands to the public domain evidences a
congressional intent with respect to those lands inconsistent
with continuation of reservation status.77
71. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 n.9. Also in In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905),
the Court adopted the position of the Solicitor General who stated:
It would seem that Congress intended citizenship of the United
States to attach at the same time that the Indian becomes subject to the
laws of the state or territory in which he resides. As a matter of constitu-
tional law, an Indian appears to be entitled to the benefit of, and subject
to, the laws of the state in which he resides the moment he becomes a
citizen of the United States. By virtue of the 14th Amendment a citizen of
the United States becomes, by residence therein, a citizen of the state, and
entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of other citizens of the
state, and to the equal protection of its laws.
Id. at 504 (citations omitted).
72. FRANCES PAUL PRucHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS: CHRISTIAN RE-
FORMERS AND THE INDIAN, 1865-1900 (1976).
73. Senator Coke preceded Dawes as the chairman of the Committee on Indian
Affairs. At the time, Senator Coke was sponsoring a nearly identical measure.
74. PRUCHA, supra note 72, at 237 (emphasis added). Prucha indicates that
Dawes himself credits Coke with the Allotment Acts. See id. at 248 n.51.
75. Although Congress clearly intended to ultimately eliminate reservations,
such elimination is not necessary to the thesis of this article. The issue is whether
tribal authority was. eliminated, which it was.
76. 510 U.S. 339 (1941).
77. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 414.
14
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As part of its analysis in Hagen, the Supreme Court looked
at demographics subsequent to the Act to determine whether
there was a practical acknowledgment that the reservation was
diminished. 8 It found that on the opened lands, approximately
eighty-five percent of the population was non-Indian. The Court
concluded:
This "jurisdictional history," as well as the current population
situation in the Uintah Valley, demonstrates a practical ac-
knowledgment that the Reservation was diminished; a contrary
conclusion would seriously disrupt the justifiable expectations of
the people living in the area.9
The Hagen Court also indicated that the non-Indian character of
an area within a reservation may result in a de facto diminish-
ment of a reservation: "On a more pragmatic level, we have recog-
nized that who actually moved onto opened reservation lands is
also relevant to deciding whether a surplus land Act diminished a
reservation.' °
The Allotment Acts are an emphatic example of congressio-
nal legislation81 designed to accomplish the "dissolution of tribal
affairs and jurisdiction."2 As part of these Acts, Indians who
either received allotments or who left the reservations were
made citizens." Congress thereby intended that Indians be in-
78. See id. at 421.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 411 (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984) ("Where
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and the area has
long since lost its Indian character, we have acknowledged that de facto, if not de
jure, diminishment may have occurred.")).
81. In certain instances Congress had to try and try again. In Hagen, 510 U.S.
at 416, 421, for example, the initial bill required tribal consent. When the tribe
chose not to consent Congress passed another bill indicating that if the tribe did not
consent the Secretary was directed to allot the lands in any event. That, in fact, is
what happened. The Court upheld the diminishment without the consent.
82. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 n.9. Indian scholar Francis
Paul Prucha in his introduction to a book by another author indicates that the Allot-
ment Acts "to, many reformers . .. was the most important means of destroying
tribalism." Francis Paul Prucha, Introduction to D.S. OTIS, THE DAwES ACT AND THE
ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS at x (1973).
83. See OTIS, supra note 81, at 15 (indicating the importance of making Indians
citizens as part of the allotment process).
It makes understandable the entire subsequent working out of the allotment
program. It was apparent that the Indian system was being smashed by
the white economy and culture. Friends of the Indian, therefore, saw his
one chance for survival in his adapting himself to the white civilization. He
must be taught industry and acquisitiveness to fit him for his "ultimate
absorption into the great body of American citizenship." Making him a citi-
zen and a voter would guarantee to him the protection of the rules under
15
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tegrated into the rest of society, with all of its rights and bene-
fits. Felix S. Cohen, in his original Handbook of Federal Indian
Law," described citizenship as one of the "non-pecuniary bene-
fits which the Indians are to receive in view of the destruction of
tribal property and tribal existence which the Act contem-
plates."5 Congressional intent was so clear that the government
itself recognized that reservations had been abolished."5
c. Other Acts
After the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871, tribes
were no longer regarded as sovereign nations.87 Thus, tribes
were no longer separate states as found in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia." This obviously was a substantial diminishment of
retained sovereignty.
Congress also passed numerous acts that provided for citizen
travel through reservations, and for trade between Indians and
non-Indians, both on and off reservations. The various Trade and
Intercourse Acts"s provided for such travel and commerce.
Those Acts also provided for federal jurisdiction over crimes in
Indian country which varied from time to time.9 As time
passed, the allowable intrusion into Indian country and affairs
increased.91
To accomplish integration and to facilitate commerce, acts as
early as 1899 provided for grants of rights of way across tribal
and allotted lands for telephone and telegraph lines and offic-
es. 2 Beginning in 1901, Acts provided for grants of public high-
which the competitive game of life was played.
Id. (emphasis added)
84. FELix S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (1941).
85. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
86. For example, the Department of the Interior in its 1915 sale of allotted
lands to the general public represented in its regulations that the lands for sale to
non-Indians were within the "Former Flathead Indian Reservation, Mont." Depart-
ment of Interior Regulations issued March 20, 1915.
87. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 432 (1975). The Act
provided in part that "no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty." Indian Appropriation Act of
March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (emphasis added).
88. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
89. See COHEN, supra note 84, at 68-74.
90. See id. for a discussion of the various Trade and Intercourse acts.
91. See id.
92. In 1899, the Secretary of Interior was empowered to grant rights of way for
railways, telephone lines, and telegraph lines. Act of Mar. 2 1899, ch. 374, 30 Stat.
16
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way rights of way.93 Other acts provided for the condemnation
of allotted lands for any public purpose, under the laws of the
state or territory.' The Act of April 17, 1926,95 gave the Secre-
tary the authority to enter into mining leases, without tribal
consent, on certain reservation lands. Other legislation of the
1950s provided for transfers of Indian land to non-Indians 6 and
for various rights of way for all purposes across land held in
trust for individual Indians or tribes, without consent of the
owner. 7 The Indian Long Term Leasing Act of 1955 allowed the
Secretary of the Interior to approve leasing of most Indian Trust
Lands.9"
Other legislation related to the termination of tribes or to
state jurisdictional rights over both civil and criminal matters
concerning tribal members. For example, legislation in the 1950s
and early 1960s was intended to terminate approximately 109
tribes and bands.9 Of particular importance is Public Law
280.1' As initially enacted, it provided for the transfer of crimi-
nal and civil jurisdiction over Indian lands from the federal to
state governments in five states, and provided for the assump-
tion of jurisdiction by all other states. °1 It did not provide for
tribal consent. 2
The foregoing statutes typify various acts of Congress relat-
ing to Indian tribes, Indian reservations, and the relationship
between Indians and non-Indians. They show that Congress
intended the complete assimilation of tribes into the United
States."( Indian scholar Felix S. Cohen appears to agree with
990 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 312).
93. See Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 832, 31 Stat. 1058, 1084 (codified as 25 U.S.C.
§ 311).
94. See COHEN, supra note 84, at 80.
95. Ch. 156, 44 Stat. 300 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 400a).
96. See 25 U.S.C. § 483 (1994).
97. See 25 U.S.C. § 323-328 (1994).
98. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 396, 415-415d.
99. "Between 1954 and 1962 fourteen acts were passed requiring development of
plans for terminating the federally recognized status of approximately 109 tribes and
bands." AMERicAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 4, at 24-25.
100. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1325 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994).
101. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1325 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994).
102. See COHEN (Strickland ed.), supra note 6, at 175-77.
103. These acts together with the Allotment Acts show not only that Congress
intended for Indians to be integrated into society, but that Congress intended that
non-Indians have substantial access to reservations. Congress had to have known
that the ultimate result of such access would be the daily inter-relationship which
now exists between Indians and non-Indians on reservations. Congress cannot have
intended that Constitutional protection of its citizens would depend on the random
17
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this assessment. In describing Indian legislation after 1900, he
indicates:
The attempt to wind up tribal existence reaches a new high
point and various powers formerly vested in the tribes are
transferred by Congress to administrative officials.'"
Thereafter, in describing an act which sets aside funds for indi-
vidual Indians from the amounts which in prior legislation had
been reserved for tribes, Cohen indicates:
Section 28 of this act represents what is perhaps the culmina-
tion of the tendency to break up Indian tribes and tribal
property ... it is of a piece with legislation, already noted,
looking to the complete dissolution of the Indian tribes and the
division of tribal funds, as well as tribal lands among the mem-
bers thereof. 5
Although Congress restricted Indian sovereignty on an "as
needed," piecemeal basis, it ultimately established a complete
legislative plan for integrating Indians into the rest of society,
and the reverse. No further, significant legislation was needed.
The legislation, viewed as a whole, clearly shows that Congress
intended to abolish tribes and reservations.106
The Supreme Court has recognized that, prior to 1934,
tribes-as entities which had retained sovereignty and pow-
er-had in fact been abolished. In Morton v. Mancari,l°7 the
Court, in describing the reason for the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934,08 stated:
Congress was seeking to modify the then-existing situation
whereby the primarily non-Indian-staffed BIA had plenary con-
trol, for all practical purposes, over the lives and destinies of
the federally recognized Indian tribes."°
luck of whose land they were on and the percent of Indian blood of the person they
were dealing with. Rather, Congress was required to protect its citizens and is pre-
sumed to have done so. See infra Part III.D.
104. COHEN, supra note 84, at 82.
105. Id.
106. The Allotment Acts, for example, intended that all of the land within each
reservation be allotted to tribal members (who then became U.S. citizens) who would
receive a patent for the land in twenty five years, or to non-Indians after transfer to
the United States who would get patents immediately. See COHEN, supra note 84, at
78-79.
107. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
108. See infra Part III.D.
109. Morton, 417 U.S. at 542 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 59
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Prior to 1934, there was a complete defeasance of tribal sover-
eignty.
D. To the Extent That Congress Has Attempted to Revive Tribal
Power and Sovereignty, It Was Precluded from Providing for the
Creation of Any Tribal Governments or Tribal Judicial Systems
That Did Not Comply with the Constitution of the United States.
Based on the acts of Congress and the response of the citi-
zens to those Acts, n ° prior to 1934 there was a de facto and a
de jure defeasance and abolition of any retained powers of tribal
government. In 1934, Congress changed course with respect to
its view of the proper status of Indian tribes.' Recognizing
that, for all practical purposes, it had eliminated Indian tribes,
Congress sought to revive them."2
In 1934, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act." 3
The Act gave tribes the right to organize, to adopt constitutions
and bylaws,"4 and to have certain powers in addition to those
vested by existing law."' The Act further provided for tribal
incorporation, which vested tribes with the power to purchase
property, to conduct business, and to sell land."6 The Act gave
the Secretary of the Interior the power to provide for new Indian
reservations and to add land to existing reservations."7
In providing for the organization of tribal governments in
1934, Congress started with a clean slate. The new tribal govern-
ments received their power from Congress. Clearly Congress can
only establish governments and courts for its citizens that com-
ply with, and are subject to, the Constitution of the United
110. See supra Part III.C.2.
111. As noted supra, the course change was only temporary, and Congress con-
tinued to pass legislation relating to the elimination of tribes and reservations, even
if such legislation was redundant.
112. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 4, at 21. "The Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) was intended to reverse the General Allotment
Act's policy of weakening, if not wholly destroying the status of tribes as self govern-
ing entities." Id. (emphasis added).
113. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994).
114. To be approved by the Secretary of the Interior. See 25 U.S.C. § 476(a)
(1994).
115. See 25 U.S.C. § 476(e) (1994). It would appear that "existing law" would
refer to other acts of Congress such as the Department Appropriations Act of 1888,
25 Stat. 217, 233, which provided for the Court of Indian Offenses, now called "CFR
Courts" under 25 C.F.R. § 11 (1997). See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 196 n.7 (1978).
116. See 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1994).
117. See 25 U.S.C. § 467 (1994).
19
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States."' With respect to territories of the United States, Con-
gress started with a clean slate as well.119 In United States v.
Kagama1so the Supreme Court suggested that Congress' power
over territorial governments and Congress' power over tribes has
the same basis. Also, as is the case with tribes, Congress has
plenary power over territories. 2'
The Supreme Court has consistently held that when Con-
gress establishes governments and courts in territories it must
require that the resulting government comply with the United
States Constitution." In Rassmussen v. United States.. the
Court held that Congress, in establishing the Territory of Alas-
ka, did not have the power to provide for a jury trial that did not
comply with the Sixth Amendment." 4 In its analysis the Court
concluded that the Constitution was self-operative, and that the
Constitution applied to the territories even if Congress did not so
indicate."2 Thus, the Court held that where Congress, in estab-
lishing laws for the Territory of Alaska, did not comply with the
118. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1957).
119. See Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1899) (holding that with respect
to the territories Congress has complete dominion and legislative power and may
delegate that power to the legislative assembly of a territory); United States v.
McMillan, 165 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1897); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894)
(holding that Congress has complete power over the territories).
120. 118 U.S. 375, 379-81 (1886).
121. See El Paso & N.E. Ry. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 93 (1909).
122. Except in the so called "Insular Cases" which dealt with the application of
the Constitution to unincorporated territories of the United States, such as Puerto
Rico. See Balzak v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). Arguably, even this
exception has been laid to rest. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1957). Even if
the Insular Cases are still viable, they are not applicable to Indian Tribes which are
part of the United States. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18
(1831).
123. 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
124. See Rassmussen 197 U.S. ( Pet.) at 526-27.
125. The Court stated:
Without attempting to examine in detail the opinions in the various cases,
in our judgment it clearly results from them that they substantially rested
upon the proposition that where territory was a part of the United States
the inhabitants thereof were entitled to the guaranties of the Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh Amendments, and that the act or acts of Congress purporting
to extend the Constitution were considered as declaratory merely of a result
which existed independently by the inherent operation of the Constitution. It
is true that, in some of the opinions, both the application of the Constitu-
tion and the statutory provisions declaring such application were referred
to, but in others no reference to such statutes was made, and the cases
proceeded upon a line of reasoning leaving room for no other view than
that the conclusion of the court was rested upon the self-operative appli-
cation of the Constitution.
Id. at 526-27 (emphasis added).
20
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requirements of the Constitution, those laws were void."s In
Thompson v. Utah'27 the Court held that even where the action
had arisen prior to Utah becoming a state, the Constitution ap-
plied." The fact that Congress must legislate in a manner
consistent with the Constitution is emphasized by the Court's
holding that Congress must comply with the Constitution when
it passes laws requiring state action."
As previously noted, Reid v. Covert"3° indicates that Con-
gress has no power to act outside the Constitution. "The United
States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution." 3' Thus,
to the extent that Congress has restored Indian powers and even
Indian sovereignty, it was required to-and was presumed
to-impose constitutional requirements. Because of the self-im-
plementing nature of the Constitution, Congress did not need to
expressly apply or refer to the Constitution in its legislation.
When Congress passed the 1934 Indian Reorganization
Act, "'32 it provided for the establishment of tribal governments
126. See id. at 528. The Court in its analysis relied upon a case arising from
the Territory of Montana. See Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889). There the
Court concluded:
The Seventh Article of Amendment of the Constitution declares that,
"in suits as common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twen-
ty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States
than according to the rules of the common law." This article of the Consti-
tution is in full force in Montana, as in all other organized territories of
the United States.
Id. at 28.
127. 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
128. See Thompson 170 U.S. at 346-47 (quoting Springville City v. Thomas, 166
U.S. 707 (1897)). The Court stated:
That the provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating
to the right of trial by jury in suits at common law apply to the Territories
of the United States is no longer an open question . . . . "In our opinion,
the Seventh Amendment secured unanimity in finding a verdict as an es-
sential feature of trial by jury in common-law cases, and the act of Con-
gress could not impart the power to change the constitutional rule, and
could not be treated as attempting to do so."
Id. (emphasis added).
129. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (Congress is with-
out power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federal-state program by legislation
which authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.).
130. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
131. Reid 354 U.S. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
132. The Act, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1997), provided for Tribal consti-
tutions under section 476 and Tribal charters under section 477. The tribal constitu-
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which were subject to the Constitution. In Springville City v.
Thomas," the supreme court of the Territory of Utah had held
that the organic act of the territory had vested the territory's leg-
islature with nearly unlimited power."M The territory's su-
preme court then held that the territory's legislature could
change the number of jurors which were necessary to reach a
verdict in a civil action from the unanimous verdict required by
the Seventh Amendment.'35 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, stating:
[T]he [territorial] court held in effect that the act of Congress
was constitutional, although it empowered the territorial legis-
lature to provide for verdicts by less than the whole number of
jurors. The question involved was not [a] matter of construction
of the territorial act, but the court discussed its validity, and
this depended on the validity of the act of Congress giving it
the scope which the court attributed to it.
In this there was error. In our opinion, the Seventh
Amendment secured unanimity finding a verdict as an essential
feature of trial by jury in common-law cases, and the act of
Congress could not impart the power to change the constitution-
al rule, and could not be treated as attempting to do so.'
Historically, the Court has held that the Indian Commerce
Clause'37 created a special relationship with Indian tribes. For
example in Morton v. Mancari,"3 s the Court noted that this spe-
cial relationship "singles Indians out as a proper subject for
separate legislation."139 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,'
the Court indicated the relationship with Indian tribes has "al-
ways been... anomalus ... and of a complex character."'
Some might argue that this special relationship "changes the
rules" when Congress legislates with respect to Indian tribes,
and that Congress is not required to impose the same constitu-
tions had to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The tribal charters were
to be issued by the Secretary of Interior. As indicated supra, Congress could not
have provided that the Secretary of the Interior act in an unconstitutional manner.
133. 166 U.S. 707 (1897).
134. See Springville City, 166 U.S. at 708.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 708-09 (emphasis added); see also Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343,
346-47 (1898).
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
138. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
139. Morton, 417 U.S. at 552.
140. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
141. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tional restraints in such legislation. Such a position ignores the
clear language in the preceding cases with respect to the consti-
tutional limitations on the powers of Congress. The position also
has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court.
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,' the Court held
that the power granted to Congress by the Indian Commerce
Clause would not overcome other constitutional constraints on
Congress."4  In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot.
Assn.,'" the Court held that Indian religious rights on federal
lands were not enhanced, stating "[t]he First Amendment must
apply to all citizens alike.""5 Further, the Supreme Court has
expressly stated that when Congress attempts to delegate powers
to tribes, it can only grant powers which are subject to the con-
straints of the Constitution. In Duro v. Reina,' 6 the Court stat-
ed:
Had the prosecution been a manifestation of external relations
between the Tribe and outsiders, such power would have been
inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status, and could only
have come to the Tribe by delegation from Congress, subject to
the constraints of the Constitution.47
142. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
143. In holding that the limitation of the Eleventh Amendment was a limitation
on the power of Congress, despite the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court stated:
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background
principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area,
like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control
of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress
complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amend-
ment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power
under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitu-
tional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner's suit against
the State of Florida must be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.
Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
144. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
145. Id. at 452.
146. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
147. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686 (emphasis added). Congress has attempted to reverse
Duro by passing an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act which purports to
recognize and reaffirm the inherent powers not recognized in Duro. 25 U.S.C. §
1301(2) (1994). Congress may have been attempting to circumvent the requirement
that it impose constitutional restraints with respect to the exercise of criminal juris-
diction over non-tribal member Indians, which was the power not recognized by
Duro. Both the language in Duro, and the holding in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957), would appear to preclude this. See generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v.
Reina and the Legislation that Overturned it: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimen-
s/ons, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767 (1993).
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Thus, tribes operating under the Indian Reorganization
Act'" were required to establish constitutions and tribal gov-
ernments which were subject to guarantees found in the United
States Constitution.149  However, they have not all done so.
While some tribes may contend otherwise, clearly tribal govern-
ments have constitutional problems. This fact has been recog-
nized by both Congress and the Supreme Court."5 Requiring
tribes to comply with the Constitution will either change the way
in which tribes function, or will reduce their jurisdiction to in-
clude only those tribal members who, in fact, waive their con-
stitutional rights with respect to conduct on tribal lands.
E. Impact on Tribes of Constitutional Requirements
Tribes are not states'' and therefore the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to them. Rather, because tribes now
derive their power from Congress, the constitutional law that
148. All provisions of this act do not apply to all tribes. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 473,
478, 478-1; see also, AMERICAN INDIAN LAw DESKBOOK, supra note 4, at 22 (indicat-
ing that 195 tribes have elected coverage or are deemed to have elected coverage).
Seventy-seven tribes, where the Act does not apply, or where coverage was rejected,
may have extremely limited powers, because they do not have any congressional
basis for their governments. Congress has given them power in other acts, such as
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1303 (1997). Any such granted
power would be subject to the Constitution. In any event, any powers they are exer-
cising with respect to citizens, whether by congressional act or inherent power, would
be subject to the Constitution because of its self implementing nature.
149. In Montana, reservations where tribal governments are organized pursuant
to the 1934 Act are: the Blackfeet Reservation; the Flathead Reservation; the Fort
Belknap Reservation; the Rocky Boy Reservation; and the Tongue River Reservation
(Northern Cheyenne). See PETER C. MAXFIELD, ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON
AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 313 (1977).
150. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Also in its discussion of the Indi-
an Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§1301-1303, the Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueb-
lo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), quoted the bill's chief sponsor as saying that the
bill "should not be considered as the final solution to the many serious constitutional
problems confronting the American Indian." Id. at 71. The Court indicated that Con-
gress recognized that there were abuses of tribal power, but had decided to address
the most serious abuses first in the ICRA. If the thesis of this paper is correct,
there was no need to enact the Indian Civil Rights Act to provide constitutional
protections to tribal members. The fact that Congress enacted the ICRA is not an
indication that prior congressional acts did not abolish tribal sovereignty or that
Congress has not already imposed the requirement that tribes comply with the Con-
stitution. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420 (1994). "[T]he views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." Id. (quot-
ing a series of earlier cases, indicating that the rule is "our long standing observa-
tion").
151. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 59 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/4
19981 THE CONSTITUTION AND INDIAN TRIBES 75
has developed with respect to the conduct of the federal govern-
ment should govern the conduct of tribes.'52 The constitutional
equal protection requirements relating to voting and jury trials
are significant because they relate to the power of tribes to im-
pact non-tribal members. Tribal member citizens will tend to
have more traditional constitutional issues (such as due process)
with respect to whether their government is treating them fairly.
Clearly, however, requiring tribes to function in a manner con-
sistent with the Constitution will change the nature of most
tribes.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides equal protection for
citizens of states." On its face, however, the Fourteenth
Amendment operates as a limitation on states and not on the
federal government. Because tribes now derive their power from
the federal government, other constitutional provisions deter-
mine the extent of equal protection.
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment has tradi-
tionally been viewed as providing some standard of equal protec-
tion with respect to actions of the federal government. It is now
clear that the Fifth Amendment provides for the same protection
as the express equal protection language of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "[I]t would be unthinkable that the same Constitu-
tion would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government'
than it does on a State to afford equal protection of the
laws.l" Thus, the standard of providing for equal protection by
tribes should be the same as the standard for states and the
federal government from which tribes derive their power. Thus,
those Supreme Court cases establishing equal protection stan-
dards for states apply equally to tribes.
152. It is obviously beyond the scope of this article to discuss the complete ex-
tent of this law.
153. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part, "nor shall any State deprive
any person of... equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
154. This longstanding constitutional principle was reinstated in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225 (1995) (quoting Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
397, 400 (1953)). The Court stated:
As we have explained, Metro Broadcasting [which the Court expressly over-
ruled] undermined important principles of this Court's equal protection ju-
risprudence, established in a line of cases stretching back over fifty years.
Those principles together stood for an "embracing" and "intrinsically
soun[d]" understanding of equal protection "verified by experience," namely,
that the Constitution imposes upon federal, state, and local governmental
actors the same obligation to respect the personal right to equal protection
of the laws.
Id. at 231-32 (citations omitted).
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Applying equal protection requirements to tribes should
change voter qualification requirements where the tribe has
attempted to assert jurisdiction over non-members. 1" The non-
members under those circumstances should have the right to
vote in tribal elections. This is because of the basic constitutional
requirement that citizens be allowed to vote for those individuals
their govern our lives.
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having
a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which,
as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most ba-
sic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.
In the landmark case of Baker v. Carr,'57 the Supreme
Court rejected the proposition that voting issues were only po-
litical questions and were not justiciable." Since then the
Court has indicated that the equal protection clause applies to
laws relating to the regulation of elections." 9 For example, the
Supreme Court in Quinn v. Millsapl" struck down a provision
of the Missouri Constitution which provided that in certain in-
stances the electorate was required to be composed of free-
holders.1"1 Finding that the provision denied equal protection,
the Court stated:
The rationale of the Missouri Supreme Court's contrary
decision would render the Equal Protection Clause inapplicable
even to a requirement that all members of the board be white
males. This result, and the reasoning that leads to it, are obvi-
ously untenable." 2
155. Any tribe that limits its legislation on its face to strictly tribal members on
tribal lands or tribal member lands would not appear to have constitutional problems
with excluding non-tribal members from voting. However, where a tribe purports to
exercise either regulatory or judicial authority over non-members (even if, in fact, it
has no jurisdiction) it would appear to have constitutional problems with excluding
non-members from voting in elections for tribal governing bodies and excluding non-
members from those bodies, as will be shown.
156. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
157. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
158. See Baker, 491 U.S. 186.
159. See, e.g., Williams, 393 U.S. at 29.
160. 491 U.S. 95 (1989).
161. See Quinn, 491 U.S. at 106-07.
162. Id. at 106. The Court held that the equal protection clause was applicable
even though the board was a form of public service and could only recommend pro-
posals to the electorate. See id. at 105. Certainly election of tribal legislators, who
purport to legislate for non-members would be subject to the same constitutional
constraints.
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Where tribal governing bodies purport to make laws or rules
that impact non-members residing within the confines of a reser-
vation, then the Constitution requires that non-members be
allowed to vote in elections and to run for office. Tribal member-
ship and the related voting requirements are based on race."
If tribes seek to govern non-Indians, they cannot make race-
based distinctions for voting requirements.' Where the deci-
sions of a tribe may impact non-Indian citizens on a reservation,
equal protection requires that those citizens be given the right to
vote in tribal elections."
The same equal protection requirements apply with respect
to tribal juries. Selection of juries in cases involving non-tribal
members, from a class of individuals containing only tribal mem-
bers cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. In Georgia v.
McCollum" and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,167 the
Supreme Court held that selection of jurors in either criminal or
civil cases based on race was an unconstitutional violation of the
equal protection clause. The basic principle is one of long stand-
ing. After the Fourteenth Amendment, but before the Nineteenth
Amendment (providing for women's suffrage), the Court in
Strauder v. West Virginia" struck down a West Virginia stat-
ute which provided that only white males could serve on juries.
The Court held that one race could not exclude another race
from juries." Batson v. Kentucky7" expressly reaffirmed the
163. See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994) (defining Indian in terms of Indian descent or
Indian blood). In Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901), the Court stat-
ed "[bly a 'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race."
164. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557-61 (1964) (stating that voter quali-
fications cannot be race-based).
165. See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (holding that individuals living
on a Federal enclave within the State of Maryland who were impacted by State laws
were, because of the requirements of equal protection, entitled to vote in Maryland
elections).
166. 505 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1992).
167. 500 U.S. 614, 628-29 (1991).
168. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
169. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
That the West Virginia statute respecting juries--the statute that
controlled the selection of the grand and petit jury in the case of the plain-
tiff in error-is such a discrimination ought not to be doubted. Nor would it
be if the persons excluded by it were white men. If in those States where
the colored people constitute a majority of the entire population a law
should be enacted excluding all white men from jury service, thus denying
to them the privilege of participating equally with the blacks in the admin-
istration of justice, we apprehend no one would be heard to claim that it
would not be a denial to white men of the equal protection of the laws.
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principles of Strauder. In Batson, the Court quoted Strauder,
stating:
The very idea of a jury is a body ... composed of the peers or
equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to
determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons
having the same legal status in society as that which he
holds.1
7 1
As citizens, non-tribal members should be entitled to a jury
which does not exclude non-tribal members.17 Although the
Secretary of the Interior may have approved tribal constitutions
and court systems which allow only tribal members to vote and
to serve on juries, the Secretary did not have the power to do so,
because Congress could not give him that power.
173
F. Remedies
This discussion means nothing unless courts have the power
to remedy unconstitutional tribal acts. Because tribes do not
have the power to act in an unconstitutional manner,
courts-including tribal courts-should hold that where constitu-
tional tests are not met, tribes lack the jurisdiction to act.74
Courts can refuse to enforce unconstitutional tribal judg-
ments. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held
Id.
170. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
171. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (emphasis added).
172. Tribal members should not be excluded either. No individual should be
excluded simply on the basis of race.
173. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 346-47 (1898).
174. Tribal courts, of course, may recognize the validity of what has been said
here and refuse to enforce tribal acts and tribal powers which are unconstitutional.
Tribal courts can also implement the proper equal protection and due process proce-
dures in their courts. With respect to other courts, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S.
Ct. 1404 (1997), holds that to the extent that retained sovereignty of tribes has been
diminished and the power to act has not been replaced by congressional action then
tribes lack the jurisdiction (power) to act. If, retained sovereign powers have been
eliminated to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Constitution, they have
not been replaced by powers, even inherent powers which are inconsistent with the
Constitution. Thus tribes have no power to act in an unconstitutional manner. Strate
also holds that a federal district court may, in the first instance, determine the juris-
diction of a tribe where it is evident that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority.
See id. at 1416 n.14.
The rule precluding federal court jurisdiction in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marti-
nez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), does not apply, because the Court in Martinez was looking
only at whether Congress had provided for jurisdiction in connection with the Indian
Civil Rights Act. District court jurisdiction here would be based on general constitu-
tional principals, and not on the Indian Civil Rights Act.
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that a Blackfeet tribal judgment "may neither be recognized nor
enforced in the United States Courts."175 In its analysis as to
why it withheld comity, the Court stated "[a] federal court must
also reject a tribal judgment if the defendant was not afforded
due process of law."7"
Federal courts would also have the power to impose the
Constitution on tribal activities. In Missouri v. Jenkins,77 the
Supreme Court ruled that a federal district court could order a
school district to levy property taxes which would be necessary to
fund a desegregation remedy, and that it could enjoin the op-
eration of state laws which would have prevented the school
district from imposing the required taxes. 78 In Jenkins the Su-
preme Court held that federal courts have the power to remedy
unconstitutional conduct on the part of governments. Utilizing
the same power, federal courts could enjoin tribal laws and pro-
cedures which would lead to an unconstitutional result. For
example, a federal court could enjoin the prosecution of suits in
tribal court where the jury selection process was unconstitutional
or could bar tribal elections which were unconstitutional. 79
Although tribes have sovereign powers, they are powers
derived from the United States, and are not retained powers.
While tribes themselves may have sovereign immunity in some
circumstances, this immunity should not extend to tribal officials
or entities when they act in an unconstitutional or illegal
manner."o Thus, such officials would be subject to suit in fed-
eral court. The laws passed and the decisions rendered would be
subject to review for the constitutional validity of the pro-
cess.
lsl
175. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 815 (9th Cir. 1997).
176. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811.
177. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
178. See Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51.
179. See generally Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34-35 (1968) (upholding an
injunction issued by a three judge district court ordering the Governor of Ohio to
change Ohio's election process to comply with Constitutional requirements).
180. See generally Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
858-59, 868 (1824).
181. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). This does not an-
swer the question of whether such decisions would otherwise be subject to review for
their correctness if the process was otherwise constitutional. That issue is beyond the
scope of this article.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The perception that the Constitution of the United States
does not apply to the conduct of Indian tribes is not valid. When
Congress eliminated the nation status of tribes, opened reserva-
tions for commerce and settlement by its citizens, and provided
for Indians' citizenship, it left no room for tribes to have powers
which are inconsistent with the Constitution. To paraphrase the
Court in Montana, it defies common sense to believe that Con-
gress would have intended to provide for the complete integra-
tion and assimilation of tribes and reservations into the fabric of
society and yet to have intended that tribes retain sovereignty to
directly impact the lives of its citizens (both tribal members and
non-tribal members) without constitutional accountability."2
When it resurrected tribes, Congress necessarily imposed the
Constitution.
182. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 n.9.
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